By J Hamilton, Attorney at Law
This post is in reference to Devon Dick’s article entitled: Withdraw, Honourable Lightbourne, published in The Gleaner on May 26, 2011. Click here to see article:
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110526/cleisure/cleisure2.html
Reverend Devon Dick in his defence of Jeremy Taylor, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions (Taylor) – see article, “Withdraw, Honourable Lightbourne” dated May 26, 2011 - characterised Minister Lightbourne’s (the Minister) comments on Taylor’s advice and Verna McGraw’s evidence at the Manatt enquiry as “unfortunate and unfounded”.
He asserts that Taylor was correct in advising the ‘US’ not to apply for a provisional warrant to arrest Coke since he might have had to be released after 60 days, as in the ‘Tony Ashman’ case; and that it was wrong to suggest that there was a causal relationship between that advice and the deaths in Tivoli. It was also wrong for the Minister to imply that McGraw’s email was a forgery or the product of a conspiracy. The Minister should, in consequence, withdraw those allegations.
It is clear that Reverend Dick did not listen to the Minister’s evidence as carefully as he should have, or review the relevant “transcripts” before rushing into print. Had he done so he would have appreciated that ‘context’ gives a different colour to the comments he considered “unfortunate and unfounded.”
The comment on Taylor’s advice, for example, arose as a result of the cross examination of the Minister by K D Knight. It was he who made the allegation that the Minister was responsible for causing the deaths in Tivoli because of her delay in handling the Coke extradition. The Minister’s response to Knight was that if, indeed, there was a causal relationship, then he should focus on the genesis of the delay, that is Taylor’s advice to the ‘US’.
Taylor testified that the ‘US’ regarded Coke’s extradition as so urgent, that prior to submitting the request they sought his advice on the best way to proceed –whether an application for the provisional arrest of Coke should be made or a formal request for his extradition be made.
The Extradition Act (the Act) has clear and articulate provisions for dealing with requests which are urgent: by invoking those provisions Coke would have been arrested immediately and detained for at least sixty (60) days. More importantly, the Security forces would have been able during this period to mobilize and make whatever arrangements were necessary to keep the peace. The Act also required the US to submit the authenticated documents detailing the evidence within this period so that the Minister could determine whether to issue the Notice to proceed.
Adoption of the formal procedure obliged the Minister to ensure that the request complied with the statutory requirements of the Act, and that the evidence submitted justified Coke’s extradition.
Inexplicably, Taylor advised the “US” to use the formal procedure. The immediate effect was to stymie whatever plans the Security forces had to arrest Coke since they could not do so until the Minister issued the ‘Notice to Proceed; and the statutory time period (60 days) which would have impelled the parties towards expediting the process, was no longer relevant.
Evidence of the subsequent scrambling and anxious enquiries by the then Commissioner of Police, Major Cole and Taylor himself as to whether the Minister had signed the ‘Notice to proceed’ even before she had received the authenticated documents, is ample testimony that the procedure advised and adopted was not apt to deal with the factual circumstances.
Consider also that it was likely that Coke knew of the request since it was sent to persons other than those contemplated by the Act, and so unwittingly gave him time to marshall and refine his plans.
I suggest that Reverend Dick re-consider Taylor’s advice in the context of the law and facts extant, and determine how he would now characterise it – good or bad.
As to his comments on the causal relationship, his strictures should be directed at K D Knight, the person who authored it, and not the Minister.
The short answer to Lord Gifford’s submission that Coke might have had to be released if the requesting State failed to submit the evidence within sixty (60) days is that this is in accord with the provisions of ‘the Act’, the general law and the presumption of innocence and is a matter for commendation not censure.
The principle is further reinforced by the provision in the Act which recognizes the right to refuse a request, simply on the basis that the person is a Jamaican citizen.
Further, it is pure speculation that if Coke had to be released in the circumstances posited the result would be as dire as implied. Note also that the Act provides for a person to be re-arrested when the evidence is received and the Notice to proceed issued.
The issue raised in the ‘Tony Ashman’ case is misunderstood: put simply, the Magistrate made an Order to extradite Ashman on the basis of a provisional warrant – that is before the extradition proceedings commenced. Extradition proceedings commence with the issue of the Notice to proceed, and the Minister had issued none since she had not received the evidence on which to do so. The Minister could not, in the circumstances, sign the Order to extradite Ashman.
Further Ashman’s case arose in the ‘UK’ and so the time limit of 60 days was not applicable. Any time limit, would have had to be imposed by the Magistrate and this was not done.
The application to the Supreme Court therefore proceeded on a wrong premise and should not have been granted.
I am advised that the Minister has received the authenticated documents and the Order has now been signed.
It is not factual that the Minister withdrew the comment attributed to K D Knight that “all Labourite fe dead”. A review of the relevant transcript will confirm this.
Reverend Dick is correct in concluding that Ms McGraw “must have followed someone’s instructions”. Consider the following -
(a) the email was tendered by Leys Attorney although there was nothing in it to support his client’s case: nor was it put to Leys in examination-in-chief.
(b) the email was sent to the Solicitor General and copied to Brady. It is beyond comprehension why the Minister should be advising her adviser on extradition procedures and copying a person who has no formal connection with the Ministry.
(c) Ms Lightbourne had at the time an officer who was the holder of the substantive post of Executive Secretary and who dealt with her emails on a computer dedicated for the purpose. The email in question was issued from McGraw’s computer and includes no reference to the Minister
(d) Ms Mcgraw’s temporary assignment to the Minister’s Secretariat was at least 2 grades above her substantive post. Investigations will confirm that she performed at the level of a copy typist despite her ego boosting statements at the Enquiry.
(e) her employment at the Ministry pre-dated the appointment of the Minister. Her employment at the Commission while still in the employ of the Ministry was unfortunate since it created an opportunity for her to renew ‘old’ acquaintances and possibly amenable to mischief.
Reverend Dick has stated explicitly why he felt it necessary to come to Taylor’s defence - his Baptist antecedents – even before the Commission has reported; but in doing so he should be fair and not seek to buttress his views by the eclectic selection of evidence.
I am sure that on reflection Reverend Dick will appreciate that he did Minister Lightbourne a grave injustice, and that he will follow his own advice and make appropriate amends.
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